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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—In the Letters, which I did myself the honour to address to the Prince Regent upon the subject of the dispute with America, I observed, that, in the present state of the matter, it was impossible to say, which of the two ships, the *Little Belt* or the *President*, fired the first shot. That point, however, now appears to have been settled by a *Court of Inquiry*, held at New-York, by order of the American Government, an abstract of the Proceedings of which Court will be found in another part of this Number.—From these proceedings it appears, that about twenty witnesses were examined, and that all of them, except three, were quite positive as to the fact, that the first shot was fired by the *Little Belt*. The three who were not quite positive as to this point, said, that they believed the first shot was fired by the *Little Belt*: but that they were not in a situation actually to see the flash, and to be quite sure of the matter. The rest swear that they both saw the flash and heard the report.—One would think, that, after this, there could be no longer any dispute about the fact; but, so far from such a conclusion having been drawn by our venal prints, they, on the contrary, treat the proceedings of this Court with perfect contempt, and all the witnesses who swore to the fact, they treat as perjured men.—The *TIMES*, with a degree of insolence rarely to be met with, even amongst writers secure of impunity, says: “It has, as we predicted, become a matter of downright swearing; and it is hard to say we do not believe so many men, who declare upon oath that our vessel fired the first gun: yet, in plain English, we do not; but are willing to attribute their deviation from truth to error, rather than to intentional falsehood.”—This last part is even more insolent than the rest; for, error was impossible, where twenty people swore positively, that they saw the flash and heard the report; that they were all both eye and ear witnesses of the fact. “A matter of downright swearing!” And thus all these Officers and Petty Officers of a Frigate

are to be held forth as perjured wretches because their evidence does not suit the purposes of these writers.—The *Courier*, which yields to none now except the *Times*, says: “Notwithstanding the evidence of these persons, we still must adhere to our belief in the veracity of Capt. Bingham’s statement. For, even putting out of our consideration the improbability that a sloop of war should commence hostilities within pistol shot of a large 44 gun frigate, we have Captain Bingham receiving from his commanding Officer, Admiral Sawyer, just before he sailed, most positive directions to be particularly careful not to give any just cause of offence to the Government or subjects of the United States.” We cannot, therefore, believe that he would, the very first time he met an American ship, fly in the face of these orders; and for what purpose? to draw down hostilities upon his little ship from a large 44 gun frigate which he could not expect to take, and which could not do but the greatest injury both to his crew and vessel. But it will be said, are we prepared to believe all the witnesses examined in America perjured? We reply, and are we to give up Captain Bingham and his Officers, and believe them perjured? They declare, that after the second hail the American frigate fired, not a single gun, but a broadside; that the *Little Belt* did not fire the first.”—Now, in the first place, I have never seen the proceedings of any Court, where the Officers of Captain Bingham were sworn. I have seen his Letter, indeed, giving an account of the affair; but, I have never seen the report of any trial upon the subject, nor do I believe, that any thing of the kind has taken place.—The Letter of Captain Bingham is, indeed, in direct opposition to the oaths of the witnesses in America. But, is this letter to be opposed to those oaths, when we come to speak of the matter seriously? Is the bare word of one man, and that man too the party accused, to be set up against the clear oaths of twenty eye and ear witnesses? Such a thing was never heard of before; and the attempt bespeaks a total want of impartiality.—But, says the *Courier*, we

must either believe the American witnesses to be all perjured, or must believe Captain Bingham to be perjured. Even in this case, who would believe, what jurymen would believe *one* man's oath against the oaths of *twenty* men? This, however, is not a fair way of stating the case; for, we have no *oath* of Captain Bingham; and, if we had, I should be inclined to impute it to *error*, as the Times does in the case of the American Witnesses; for, such an error *one* man might fall into, but for *twenty* men to fall into an error as to a fact of which they swear they were eye and ear witnesses, is impossible.—The Courier opposes to all these positive statements upon oath, *probabilities*. He says, that it is *improbable*, that a sloop of war should have attacked a frigate; and, then, he says, that, besides, Captain Bingham had such *positive Orders* from his Commodore not to do any thing to give just cause of offence to the American Government or People. If this reasoning were of any weight, who that transgressed any order or any law, would ever want a defence? According to this the more positive the law, and the more flagrant the violation of it, the stronger would be the presumption in favour of the inculpated person. Yet, in the existence of the Orders here referred to, does this writer find that whence he concludes, and would have his readers conclude, that a fact, attested by twenty eye and ear witnesses, is false.—There is another fact attested by these witnesses, namely, that the American guns were loaded with nothing but *round and grape shot*, while Captain Bingham, in his Letter (page 212 of this Volume) says, that *bits of old iron* were fired at him.—I do not wish to dwell upon this subject, and am quite willing to attribute Captain Bingham's statement to error; but, I must believe the oaths of twenty men in preference to the assertion of one man, however respectable he may be in point of character, and however anxiously I may wish that his assertion were correct.—By a contrary decision what should I do? Why, I should pronounce all the world to be liars, our own nation excepted; I should put all the rest of the world out of the pale of credence; I should assume, what would be intolerable even to think of, that, from the moment any nation came to have a dispute with England, that nation ought to be considered as totally unworthy of belief in any case whatever. In private life, who is so *unreliable* as the man who is al-

ways in the right? The pest is not more to be shunned than such a man. And, will not the same rule apply to nations? A war with such a nation must necessarily be a war of extermination; for, who is to make peace with those, who lay it down as a maxim, that those who are opposed to them are *never to be believed*?—The Times has applied to the officers on board the President, the remarks as to the little credit generally due to *American merchant Captains*. But, how wide is the difference? These Captains have been, for twenty years, carrying on a profitable commerce under forged papers and false manifestoes? To the disgrace of nations the revenue laws have given rise to a species of false swearing, which, from being so common, scarcely any man looks upon as perjury; and, it is well known, that a *white lie* and a *Custom-house oath* have long been terms almost synonymous. Is there any comparison between oaths thus taken and the oaths taken upon the occasion of which we are speaking? If these masters and lieutenants and midshipmen and petty officers swore falsely, it must be well known to the rest of the crew; and, will the reader believe, that any twenty men in the world, except they were taken from on board the Hulks, would, under such circumstances, be guilty of the crime of false-swearing; that they would, and without any interested object to answer, voluntarily thus expose themselves to be held in abhorrence by their comrades and their country? I think not; I think that no man of sense and of common candour will believe, or affect to believe this; and, therefore, I must conclude, that it is now a settled point, that the Little Belt *did fire the first shot*.—If this be so, then, what will those persons now say, who before so loudly cried out for *satisfaction*? The satisfaction now makes an item on the other side of the account. Let us hope, however, that, as satisfaction was really taken upon the spot, the matter will now rest, and be forgotten as soon as possible; and, very soon it would be forgotten, were there not such swarms of venal writers to fan the embers of ill-will, and by every species of contumely to work into enemies those who would fain be our friends.—In the same article where the Courier speaks of the American witnesses as unworthy of belief, he takes occasion to complain of the virulence against this country displayed by the American writers. "The American Editors are more than usually coarse



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"and violent against this country, and particularly against our revered and afflicted Monarch, upon whose venerable head all possible scurrilities are accumulated."

—If this be true, it is, as far as relates to the King, very unmanly, and I am sure it is confined to a small portion of the public prints in America, where the great majority of the people are of too reflecting a turn to be pleased with any such like matter. But, unmanly as it is, it does not surpass what we have seen in the Morning Post and the Courier, the former of whom has distinctly asserted, that Buonaparté and his ministers boasted of being addicted to the horrid crimes of the Vere Street gang; and both prints have been, and are, in the constant habit of calling the empress of France the mistress of Buonaparté, and his son a bastard. This is full as unmanly as any thing that can have been said by the American editors respecting the King; and, though one bad act does not justify another, it does not become those, who are themselves guilty of such acts, to stand foremost as the accusers of others who are guilty in the same way.

—But, have the Americans had no provocation? Not to be scurrilous on the King, especially in his present unhappy state, I allow; but, have not the venal prints in England been guilty of scurrilities against their President? Is there a term of reproach which they have not conferred upon him? Is there an expression conveying contempt which they have not used as applicable to him? Have they not even broadly asserted, that he has betrayed his country to France? And, have they not appealed for the proof to the publications of Mr. Smith, who has notoriously been guilty of the most shameful breach of confidence, and who is an object of scorn with every upright man that has heard his name mentioned? And, is it after all this that they complain, that they find the face to complain, of the coarseness and violence of the American writers against this country? What, then, our venal writers are to abuse and insult whomsoever they please; they are to calumniate and vilify every one who acts in opposition to their views; and, if any one attempts to retaliate, he is to be accused of coarseness and violence! This is the way they deal with their domestic opponents: they do that with impunity; but, it is not so with regard to foreign nations, who, in one way or another, never fail to make England suffer for these outrages of its venal press.

—In the articles, upon which I have been observing, mention is made of a design on the part of the American Government to lay an Embargo, at which measure our writers affect to laugh. They say that America has tried it before, and was glad to abandon it.—They do not advert to the change that has since taken place in the situation of America; they do not perceive, that, since the year 1807, America has reared manufactories nearly equal to the supply of her own wants. Lord SHEFFIELD, at the last Lewes Wool Fair, fell into the same mistake. He there told his hearers, that America must deal with us for cloth; that she could obtain it in no other country; that, if she excluded our woollens for a year or two, she must make up for it by larger importations afterwards. How deceived he was! How little did he know of what had taken place in America during the last four years! How little did he know of the immense quantity of woollens, since that time, fabricated in the American States! The present non-importation law will tend to increase the manufacturing establishments in America; manufacturers will follow the manufactories; and capital will follow too, where capital is wanted. Of the raw material America will have a superabundance, and manufacturers are soon taught.

—The following paragraph, from the TIMES, three days ago, will afford a specimen of what is, and long has been, going on: "Yesterday se'nnight, a discovery was made at Liverpool, which is of considerable importance to our manufactories. In consequence of private information received by Mr. Miller, Superintendant of the Police, at Liverpool, that a man of the name of Hugh Wagstaff had arrived in Liverpool from Manchester, for the purpose of conveying implements used in manufactures to America, Mr. Miller found Wagstaff out, and watched his movements. He observed him go several times on board the American ship called the Mount Vernon, bound to New York. The information Mr. Miller had received stated, that the implements were in boxes; and yesterday se'nnight, he observed Wagstaff assisting in loading a cart with boxes, and then watched them to the water-side, and continued his observations till he saw some of the boxes put on board the Mount Vernon; the offence not being complete till the boxes were put on board. Mr. Miller then took Wagstaff into custody, and seized

" twenty-three boxes. On opening them, " they proved to contain *spindles, which are " used in the spinning of cotton.* The prisoner was taken before James Drinkwater, " Esq. the Mayor, and has been committed " to Lancaster Castle, for trial at the ensuing Assizes, under the Act of 21 Geo. III. " chap. 37." Does the reader believe, that these spindles would have been purchased if there had not been hands in America to use them? The non-importation Act of America would have prevented the landing of the spindles; but, the shipper knew, doubtless, before-hand, that he could ship them without risk, and that a relaxation of the law would be obtained in his favour.—Well: the spindles will not go in this instance; but, is it to be believed, that prevention will take place in all cases? And, if that were possible, what then? Why then the *Spindle-makers would go* to the place where spindles are wanted to be made.—No: there is no longer any dependence on the part of America upon England for manufactures any more than there is a political dependence. The connection might have existed for some years yet to come, had it not been cut asunder by our disputes; but, it is clearly the wish of the American government, and not less clearly the interest of their country that the connexion should cease: or, at least, that it should not be so close as it was.—And, as to exports from America, who would suffer from a stop being put to them by an Embargo? Our revenue; our navy; our courts of admiralty; our half ruined West-India planters; and, which is not to be forgotten, our armies in Spain and Portugal and the miserable people of those countries. The provisions consumed at Cadiz, at Lisbon, at Oporto, at Corunna, for the last four years, have, in great part, gone from the United States, who have sent hither all sorts of salt meat, flour, Indian-corn, wheat, oats, and even *potatoes and hay!* A curious fact, and one quite decisive as to the state of Portugal, is, that hay has been carried from New-England to Lisbon, and has produced a good profit! As to oats, I have been credibly informed, that, in one instance, a cargo from Rhode Island brought the owner *thirty-times* the original cost, besides paying freight and insurance.—That many persons in America would also suffer from an Embargo, there can be no doubt. It would ruin many merchants and ship-owners; it would injure the owners of wharfs and houses in the sea-ports; but, this is the

only way of effectually checking the growth of those sea-ports, and to do that is, I believe, an object of policy with the American government, an object, too, the accomplishment of which, in my opinion, the freedom and happiness of their country calls for at their hands.—We should hear very dismal stories about wheat and flour and beef and pork and butter and fish being a *drug*. If they were a drug one year, they would not be so the next year. Less of them would be raised. Fewer hands would be employed in raising them, and more in making implements, furniture, and wearing apparel. Instead of employing a part of the population to raise food to send to England to feed manufacturers who make goods for American use, the Americans would employ that same part of their population in making the goods at home. And would not this be better? Would not this make her more independent than she was before? Here, therefore, we see the grounds of the policy of the American government; and, to me, very sufficient grounds they appear.—It is clear, then, that every thing which tends to weaken the connexion with England must be desired by the American government, upon the ground of national policy; and, besides, it is to be observed, that the party who are opposed to the men at present in power are, in fact, an *English* party; so that to all the other motives for cutting up the connection with England, there is that of crippling for ever this party, which, while it is in open hostility to the government party, is suspected, and with but too much reason, to be, in heart, not less hostile to the freedom of the American People.—Yet, surely, all this may take place in America without giving offence to us? The Americans have a right to do what they please in their own country. " Their ships will rot." Well, let them rot: that is nothing to us. They will not then excite our envy. But if we will not suffer them either to navigate the sea or to rot at home in quiet, we may, at last, smart for our conduct. The Americans have no navy worth speaking of, nor have they, perhaps, the pecuniary means of making a great navy; but *Napoleon has*; all he wants is *seamen*, and America possesses a good hundred thousand of the best in the whole world. It would be a lamentable thing to see the ships of France manned and commanded by Americans; but, it is far from impossible; for, if we will not suffer the

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Americans to navigate the sea, those of them who live by the sea will assuredly go to man the ships of France. Wisdom, in case of a war with us, would dictate to the Americans to swell out their army and navy as little as possible; but, it would, at the same time, dictate to them to do all in their power towards completing and augmenting the fleets of France; and, in this way, they might and would become most formidable enemies to us. With their assistance Napoleon would not be long in sending his fleets to sea. The moment a war was declared against America, American officers and seamen would flock to the French navy, where they would be received with open arms, and would meet with all sorts of favours. Emolument, honours, distinction, revenge; all would unite to push them into the French service, and would urge them to deeds of valour when there. When, therefore, our venal writers are cutting their jokes upon the warlike means of America, they, as usual, forget that there are two lights in which the matter may be viewed. The state of America is changed. Her own resources have now rendered her independent of England. She wants to live in peace; but, if you force her into war; if you will make it a question of who can do the other the most mischief, the mischief you can do her is neither great nor lasting, while that which she can do you may be mortal. —Under these circumstances, the vapouring of the TIMES and the COURIER might as well be spared. Their abuse of the American President can do no good. If, with a curse, they could, as I make no doubt they would, take away his power and enslave his country, then there might be some sense in what they are doing. But, they cannot take a particle from his power or his character; and the people of America will continue to be an eye-sore to tyranny, in spite of all the execrations poured out on them by the venal press of England.

SPAIN.—*French Account of the late operations.*—The French papers have brought us an official report of the Duke of Ragusa of the late affair with our army near Rodrigo. —This account does not, as to the event of the partial actions that took place, differ materially from our own official account. Both agree, that our army had blockaded Rodrigo, and that, upon the approach of the French, the blockade was raised. —The French give

an account more in their own favour than we do; but, it does not materially differ as far as relates to what took place. The great difference is, as to the *views* of the opposite armies, and the *consequences* expected to result from these operations. —Our Commander's account says, that he found himself unable to meet the French, and that, therefore, he retired, having by his blockade of Rodrigo, compelled the French to draw a large army to that spot, by which means he made a diversion very favourable to the Spaniards. The Duke of Ragusa says, on the contrary, that the Spaniards complain of us for having left them exposed. This may not be true; but, one thing is, I think, clear from these dispatches, and that is, that the French might have pursued us further if they had been so inclined. —This was, indeed, clear enough before; for, if we could not face them in a fortified camp, how were we to face them when compelled by them to quit that camp? Our Commander speaks as plain as man can speak, upon this occasion. He says, he could not pretend to meet the French with their superior force. Indeed, it was absolutely necessary for him to say this; for, what else could account for his retiring from a spot, which he had taken such pains to strengthen? If he had not explicitly stated his inability to meet the enemy upon this occasion, what would have been said of him here; and especially after all the flourishing accounts that our newspapers had given us of his wonderful army and of the immense magazines that had been conveyed to it from Oporto. —The French Commander had, on his part, too, something to explain. He had to account for *not having pursued our army further*. He had forced us out of an entrenched camp; he had made us retreat a good distance; he had relieved Rodrigo before our eyes; and, as all this proved his great superiority of numbers, why did he not pursue us? Why did he not push us back again to the lines of Torres Vedras? —His reasons are as follows, and they are interesting in the extreme. He says to the Minister of war: "About the beginning of September, I learned that seven divisions of the English army were all assembled on the Coa; that they blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; that they were collecting fascines and gabions at Fuente Guinaldo; that the works of their entrenched camp at Fuente Guinaldo were already advanced, and that even the besieging equipage had

“ arrived there from Oporto. I then proposed to General Dorsenne, to join him with a part of my army, in order to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, to supply it with provisions for a long time, to take the entrenched camp of the enemy, his magazines, and park of besieging artillery, and, in short, to give him battle, and pursue him as far as was compatible with the general plan of operations which your Highness communicated to me in your last letter in cypher; a plan which embraces all these regions. I have now the satisfaction of announcing to your Highness, that our arms have been completely successful.” And, at the close of his dispatch, he says: —“ We should have followed the enemy to the lines of Lisbon, where we should have been able to form a junction with the army of the South, which, completely entire, has in its front only the division of General Hill, had the moment been come which is fixed for the catastrophe of the English.” —From these passages, it appears clear to me, that the intention of the French is not to put a speedy end to the war in Portugal. This was my decided opinion before, because it appeared to me, for the reasons, which I have several times stated, that it was the best line of policy that the French could pursue, to keep Portugal as a drain upon England, and to nail all our efforts to that one spot. But, now we have what seems to amount to clear proof that this is the policy upon which they are acting. —The proof does not consist in Ragusa’s saying so; but in his actions, which say so much plainer than his words; for, here we hear him stating to the Minister of war: “ I marched against the English; I drove them out of their entrenched camp; I threw part of them into great confusion.” And, why, then, his master would have said, did you not pursue an army which you had thus fleeing before you? He would have answered that question with his head, if he had not had orders to act upon a plan which forbade such pursuit; and, it was as necessary to him to state, in his dispatch, that he did act upon such a plan, as it was necessary to our Commander to state, that want of force disabled him to meet the French and compelled him to retreat. —Our venal prints affect to laugh at these parts of Ragusa’s dispatch, and treat them as empty excuses for not having been able to do more than he did. But, is Napoleon to be amused with empty excuses? Was it to him that a man would

have talked of these plans of procrastination, if such plans had had no existence? No: and the reader must be convinced, that if Ragusa had not had instructions thus to act, he would have resorted to other representations as a justification for his not pursuing further an army that he says he had driven out of its entrenched camp. —The point, therefore, appears to me settled, that it is the wish of the French to protract the war with us in Portugal. This war has been, by some persons, said to cost us 100,000*l.* a day. Round numbers are generally to be distrusted. This would amount to 36,000,000*l.* a year, which is so far beyond the bounds of credibility, that no man of common sense can believe it, the sum being almost twice as much as the cost of the whole army in all parts of the world. But, that the war is very costly no one can doubt; that it swallows a vast deal of the resources of the nation; and that it is weakening her exceedingly and precipitating the fate of her finances. —One answer to this is, that, if the army were not in Portugal, it would be somewhere else abroad. I think it had better be no where else abroad; but, if it must be, then it is a question with the French, whether Portugal is not the precise place where it is likely to do her the least harm. She, in this case, will say: ‘ England has an army and she will send it somewhere or the other to annoy me. Now, which is the place where she will do me the least mischief with that army.’ And, though I do not see where else we could do Napoleon more mischief with this army, neither do I see where we could do him less. If the army were driven out of Portugal, it might go round and give him annoyance in some parts of Spain. It might, at last, be put afloat, for menacing or attacking the empire of Napoleon in various places, and thereby giving him great annoyance. If, however, he were able wholly to destroy or capture our army in Portugal, then it might possibly, though I do not say it would, be his interest to do that without delay; but, if that is not in his power; if a pursuit of it could only end in sending it back to its lines at Lisbon, he is to consider, whether it be better for him to keep it employed in Portugal or to set it loose to be employed else where. And, next, if, upon the whole, he finds it good policy to leave it in Portugal, he has to consider, whether it be best to shut it up in the lines of Lisbon, or to keep it employed at a distance thence.

The latter long as material the Sp Torres expensi less was gazines stead of ried to expence fore, he and its the wo times, a pleases, the case would because in an could at all, v as it ap rest to drive t but tha it with as grea lines a he occ we ca uncon rope, v which do, if the Sc his ar are ab able t would ters.— expect reader the ex partial of su thoug tively this e are, test it the the A the been up a tells diate in t

The latter is certainly the wise plan, as long as its presence and operations do not materially affect his proceedings against the Spaniards; for, within the lines of Torres Vedras our army would be far less expensive to us; there would be a much less waste of life; our provisions and magazines would all be upon the spot, instead of being, as they now must be, carried to such a great distance and at an expence so enormous. The further, therefore, he can keep our army from its lines and its shipping, the better for him and the worse for us, so long as he is, at all times, able to keep it at what distance he pleases, which, at present, appears to be the case. To hem it up within those lines would be bad policy, not only because it would be maintained cheaper there; but, because his army, which would then be in an exhausted and desolated country, could scarcely be supported at all, and, if at all, with the utmost difficulty. So that, as it appears to me, not only is it his interest to make no attempt, at present, to drive the English army out of Portugal, but that it is also his interest, not to force it within its lines; but, to let it remain at as great a distance as possible from those lines all the winter.—Napoleon, while he occupies the whole of the forces, that we can spare, in Portugal, finds himself uncontrouled master in the North of Europe, which he is settling to his mind, and which he might not be able so easily to do, if we were not so wholly engaged in the South. He finds, with a *tenth* part of his army, full employment for all that we are able to send out; because, if we were able to send out a greater force, there would be no earthly excuse for the ministers.—What, then, is, *in the end*, to be expected? I put this question to the readers' serious consideration; for, it is the *end* that we are to look to, and not to partial affairs during the contest. The end of such a war is but too easily foreseen, though, perhaps, few persons, comparatively, see it in all its bearings. But, of this every man must be certain; that, if we are, *at last*, compelled to give up the contest in the Peninsula, *the longer we support it the more fatal will be the consequences*. If the American war had been given up at the end of *one* year, would it not have been much better than it was to give it up at the end of *six*? It is the *end* that tells who is the victor: all the intermediate exploits are forgotten: if they live in the page of history, they produce no

effect upon the nation that is living; and, when a people find their cause fail at the end of a long and sanguinary and arduous contest, their discouragement never fails to be great and lasting.—The withdrawing of the army from Portugal now would, doubtless, have the effect of discouraging the nation; but that effect would not be nearly so great as that of a compulsory evacuation at a year or two or three from this time, if we could suppose it possible for us to continue the war there for so long a duration. We should then have no hope but merely that of defending ourselves; and, in the meanwhile the *fleets* of Napoleon would have become formidable, notwithstanding all the silly jeering that they now call forth from the wise men who conduct most of our journals. We shall *then* begin to think of *peace*; and, what sort of a peace are we then to obtain? What sort of a close shall we then see to a war that arose out of a dispute for the possession of the *Island of Malta*? How many crowns has that war already laid low! How large a portion of Europe has it put into the hands of our enemy! Day by day it proceeds in consolidating his fearful power; and yet are there men who hope, or profess to hope, to see it end in the diminution of that power!—What are we to do then? This is a question to which no thinking man will give a hasty answer; but, if we are convinced, as I am, that the contest in the Peninsula only tends to weaken us, without finally discomfiting the enemy, it is certain, that the sooner we cease that contest the better it must be for us.—If, indeed, we had the power to send out an army in force equal to any army that Napoleon could send, the aspect of the thing would be wholly different; but, this we are not able to do; our General now tells us, at the end of three years, that, with all the aid he derives from the native troops and the universal good disposition of the people, he is not in a state to face that *part* of the French army that is brought against him, though they are assembled from a distance, and though they find him in a situation perfectly prepared. What can we want more to convince us? What can we want more to show us, that the struggle is beyond our strength?—As to the *people* of the Peninsula, whatever may be said to the contrary, they make but small exertions compared with the object. They are like all other people who see two foreign armies contending on their soil:

that is to say, they are, as far, at least, as efficient action goes, always *for the strongest*. You see no convulsive movement there as you saw in France in 1792; you do not see the towns and villages pouring forth their young men ready to perish or triumph in their country's defence. Object not, that the Spaniards and Portuguese have to fight against disciplined armies; for so had the volunteers and the national guards who fought under Kleber and Dumourier; so had the same men, veritable sans-culottes, when they won the immortal victories under Jourdain and Pichegru. There was no want of either skill or courage in their opponents; generals rocked in the cradle of war and soldiers inured to all its hardships were opposed to them; thousands upon thousands and tens of thousands fell, and often France saw reverses; but the spirit of the people of France supplied all deficiencies, surmounted all difficulties, triumphed over all misfortunes and miseries. Those who saw, as I did, the youth of France rushing forth to meet the army of the Duke of Brunswick; those who saw the sons of opulent farmers and tradesmen, promiscuously mixed with ploughmen, journeymen, apprentices, and school-boys, urged forward by their fathers and mothers and sisters to combat the invaders of France; those and those only can have an adequate idea of what the spirit of a people is capable of performing. I well remember, and I never shall forget, seeing the volunteers of Abbeville march off for the army of Luckner; but, though the recollection is strong in my memory, a just description of the scene is far beyond the powers of my pen. They poured out of the town like bees out of a hive. There were more women than volunteers. The shouting; the cheering; the waving of handkerchiefs; the strewing of boughs and flowers; the varied marks of encouragement! It was impossible not to say to oneself: "This people can never be subdued." —If I could see any signs of a spirit like this in the Spaniards and Portuguese, I should say the same of them; but, alas! I see no such sign; and, therefore, I can see no reason to hope, that they will not finally succumb to the numerous and valiant and skilfully-commanded armies of France. We are prone to think well of those, be they who or what they may, who are opposed to our enemies; but, it is but a poor mark of patriotism to become the dupes of our own wishes.—I have

now given my reasons; as amply as I think it necessary, for a speedy abandonment of the contest in the Peninsula, as far, at least, as it is, on our part, a *land war*. In my opinions I am quite sincere, though I may be in error. I shall be glad to hear and even to give publicity to any arguments that can be offered on the other side; but, if, in answer to me, nothing but senseless abuse be offered, I shall retain my opinions until I am contradicted by events.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 1st Nov. 1811.

THE BANK MEETING.

September 19, 1811.

(Concluded from p. 544.)

If he had a guinea and were to purchase bullion with it in the market, he might afterwards buy Bank of England paper, and by this circuitous means procure the loaf of bread for 13 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. This was a sufficient illustration of the fact of depreciation, and the interests of the Proprietors of Bank Stock were injured no less than the interests of the public. Mr. Clifford stated that the dollar token was now sold at 6s. 1d. and declared his conviction that the Bank note, which was now worth only 15s. would soon be worth less, and that the present condition of the affairs of the Bank bore a strong resemblance to the South Sea Scheme, and if the Directors continued to act on their present wild and absurd principles, the bubble must at length burst in the same way. (*Considerable disapprobation and hisses.*) Mr. Clifford said if they doubted it, he would give them a stanza of a ballad written in the year 1721, about the South Sea scheme, than which nothing could be more appropriate to our present situation:—

Five hundred millions notes and bonds
Our stocks are worth in value,
But neither lie in goods or lands,
Nor money let me tell ye:
Yet, though our foreign trade is lost,
Of mighty wealth we vapour,
When all the riches that we boast
Are flimsy scraps of paper.

On putting the question the motion was *not seconded*, and was consequently lost.

MR. PEARSE, the Governor, did not mean to enter into any refutation of the principles advanced by the Gentleman who brought forward the motion, as he was convinced the *general opinion of Bank Proprietors* was such as to render any such

refutation would be his vain if not a rone Gentle lars b him th was no answe against to lay such a see th rived therto such co them v the B their been t form p FORD o intrins but its mission ment. was th that th at this wishe the at Resolu lately countr in the Scotla ing of were He wi was th put in quanti quate PEARSE his po the Ba silver tined than 5 culation the di countr popul had be don B They coinin comple lected

refutation altogether unnecessary; neither would he attempt to follow him through his various calculations, of which many, if not all, were evidently founded on erroneous data. With respect to what that Gentleman had said respecting Bank Dollars being worth 6s. 1d. he could assure him that the value of one of these dollars was not more than 5s. 2d. He could only answer the charge which had been brought against the Bank Directors, for neglecting to lay before the meeting of proprietors such a statement as would enable them to see the different sources of the profits derived by the Bank, by saying, that hitherto the Proprietors had always *reposed such confidence in the Directors*, as to entrust them with the duty of deciding what sum the Bank could with safety divide from their profits (*applauses*); and it had not been thought proper to deviate from the uniform practice on this occasion.—MR. CLIFFORD observed, that he had not stated the intrinsic value of the Bank Dollar at 6s. 1d. but its value in Bank Paper, and the admission of the Governor proved his argument.—MR. PEARSE then moved, that it was the unanimous sense of the Meeting that the usual Dividends should be made at this time.—The DUKE OF NORFOLK wished to trespass for a few moments on the attention of the Meeting before the Resolution should be agreed to. He had lately been through various parts of the country, and every where, but particularly in those parts of England bordering on Scotland, he found the people complaining of the great distress to which they were put for the want of small change. He wished to know, therefore, whether it was the intention of the Bank Directors to put into circulation such an additional quantity of tokens as might be fully adequate to the wants of the people.—MR. PEARSE said, he was happy to have it in his power to inform the Noble Duke, that the Bank had a considerable quantity of silver in their possession, which they destined for coining, and that no less a sum than 500,000*l.* had already been put into circulation—considerable sums had been sent to the different large towns throughout the country, in proportion to their reputed populations; and very large sums also had been distributed among the different London Bankers, so much as 500*l.* weekly. They intended in this way to continue coining till the wants of the country were completely supplied; but it was to be recollected, that the process of coining was

such as to require a considerable time before this could be effected.—MR. CLIFFORD asked, whether, when they issued the additional tokens, the Directors meant to diminish the number of notes, if not the issue of tokens would increase the scarcity of change?—MR. PEARSE answered, that it was impossible to give an answer to that question.—The DUKE OF NORFOLK expressed his satisfaction for the communication made by Mr. Pearse, and wished to know what mode of conveyance was proposed for distributing this money throughout the country? He had been lately at a considerable town nearly a hundred miles distant, when he was informed the expence of conveyance amounted to 3 per cent.—MR. MAC AULAY said, he believed he could give the Noble Duke some information on this subject. He had been at Manchester lately, where 6000*l.* had been received in change, which was deposited in the Town Hall, and given out to the inhabitants as it was wanted; and the expence of conveyance, including freight, insurance, and every other outlay, amounted only to 25s. on the 100*l.*—The Resolution was then put and carried *nemine contradicente*, after which the meeting adjourned.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES. (*From American Prints.*)
Abstract of the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, relative to the Affair between the Little Belt and the President. Held at New York, Sept. 1811.

The Court of Enquiry on the conduct of Commodore RODGERS, in the action between the President and Little Belt, has now closed the testimony in the case.

This Court consists of—Commodore STEPHEN DECATUR, President, Captain CHARLES STEWART, Captain ISAAC CHAUNCEY—and WILLIAM PAULDING, Jun. Esq. Judge Advocate.

Of the evidence furnished to this Court, on the oaths of the several witnesses examined, we present a brief outline, in the order it was adduced; and leave the public, in a case where doubt is impossible, and conviction irresistible, to make its own comments. Whenever the proper leave is obtained, the proceedings, in their official shape and extent, shall be given to our readers.—The first witness examined was—

Charles Ludlow, Master Commandant and acting Captain of the President.—He was on board the ship at the time of the

action with the Little Belt, on the night of the 16th of May last. The Little Belt had her top-sails aback. From his position he was uncertain which fired the first gun; but the second was from the President, and was instantly followed by three cannon and musketry from the Belt. Commodore Rodgers ordered to fire low, and with two round shot. After a short pause the Belt recommenced firing, as did the President. The Belt soon appeared ungovernable, and lay bow on towards the President, when Commodore R. observed that some accident must have happened to her, and ceased firing. Her gaff was down, and her maintop-sail-yard on the cap; and mizen, too, he thinks. The action continued fourteen or fifteen minutes, including the interval. There was nothing but round and grape-shot fired, or on deck, on board the President. The ship was not on fire, or any part of her, and did not sheer off after the action. Another broadside would probably have sunk the Little Belt. Did not know or believe any part of the Commodore's official account was untrue or incorrect.

John Orde Creighton, First Lieutenant.—Was stationed at the 4th division of guns, on the upper deck. Commodore Rodgers hailed first, then a second time, when a shot was fired, as he believes, from the Little Belt, no gun having been fired or provocation given on board the President. The orders of Commodore R. were to keep the guns at half cock, and guard against accidents. After receiving the Little Belt's broadside, was ordered to fire. The Belt was silenced in five minutes, and the President ceased. The Belt renewed the fire, and Commodore R. returned it, and silenced the Belt again in five minutes. Boarded the Little Belt the next morning; Commodore Rodgers sent a friendly message, expressing regret for the occurrence, and offers of assistance. Captain Bingham said he took the President for a Frenchman. President was not on fire, and did not sheer off. Nothing but round and grape was fired or on deck. Another broadside would probably have sunk the Belt. Commodore's account confirmed.

Henry Caldwell, Commandant of Marines.—Heard the hailing; was looking at the Little Belt and saw the first shot proceed from her: on which Commodore Rodgers said, "What is that?" and he answered, "She has fired into us." Orders were then given to fire. Belt silenced in five minutes. Commodore R. was anxious to stop his fire, and did so. The Belt renewed

the action, and in six or seven minutes was silenced again, when Commodore R. was anxious to prevent mischief, and stopt his fire. No fire or sheering off. Commodore's account confirmed.

Raymond H. Y. Perry, junior Lieutenant and signal officer.—Was on the quarter deck, near Commodore Rodgers's elbow. The Commodore hailed; got no reply—hailed a second time, and got none. Heard a gun, and was looking at the Belt, which fired it, previous to any gun or provocation from the President. The Belt was silenced in five minutes, and orders were sent to every division of guns on board the President to cease. The Belt renewed the fire, and the President also. In six minutes the Belt was silenced again, and the Commodore was very anxious to stop the firing on board the President. No fire or sheering off. The Belt was in a very dangerous situation, and would, probably, have been sunk by another broadside. Heard hailing from the Belt, and understood they said their colours were down; and so reported. Commodore Rodgers hailed, "Have you struck your colours?" and was answered, "I have, and am in great distress." Lights were on board the President during the night. Commodore Rodgers's statement confirmed.

Andrew L. B. Madison, Lieutenant of Marines.—Was on the gangway. Heard the Commodore hail first, then wait fifteen or eighteen seconds, time enough for a reply, but got none, and hailed again; when the Belt fired a gun from her gangway. Saw the flash, and heard the report; no gun or provocation had been offered by Commodore Rodgers. In six seconds a gun was fired from the President, when instantly the Belt fired three guns, and then her broadside and musketry. Belt silenced in six or seven minutes. Firing stopped in the President. In two or three minutes Belt renewed the action, and in four or five minutes was again silenced: when Commodore Rodgers ordered his fire to cease, and appeared anxious to prevent damage. No firing or sheering off of the President. Commodore's report confirmed.

Captain Caldwell confirmed the account of the first and second guns and broadside, as given by the other witnesses.

Jacob Mull, sailing-master.—Was on the quarter deck. Commodore Rodgers hailed, and got no answer, but "halloo." After sufficient time hailed again, and got no reply, but a shot, without provocation. In three or four seconds returned the shot,

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and got a general fire from the Little Belt. Thought the Belt a heavy frigate until next day. Action continued fourteen or fifteen minutes, including three or four minutes' interval. Little Belt could have fired again, but President could have sunk her. Commodore's official account is true.

Lieutenant Creighton thought the Little Belt a frigate (excepting her feeble defence) until next day. Captain Bingham told him the President's colours were not hoisted, but he recollected the pendant. It is the usage as before stated by another witness, for the President to be prepared for action on coming along-side an armed vessel. Thought the Little Belt displayed bad management or want of conduct in her defence.

Joseph Smith, midshipman, acting as master's mate.—Commanded the 4th division of guns. Heard Commodore R. hail, and no reply for five seconds. Heard second hail, and was looking at the Little Belt when the first gun was fired by her, before a shot or any provocation was given from the President. The Commodore fired one gun, then the Little Belt three, and action continued. Thought the Little Belt a frigate. The duration of the action, and orders to cease, as before stated. The last order to stop firing was received by three different officers. Commodore R.'s statement confirmed.

Henry Dennison, acting chaplain.—Was on the quarter-deck. Little Belt was 70 or 80 yards distant. Heard Commodore R. hail, and the reply, and the second hail—then a gun, he thinks from the Belt, as he felt no jar in the President, and no gun or provocation had been given by Commodore R.—Account of Commodore R. confirmed.

Michael Roberts, boatswain.—Was on the fore-castle, saw the flash and heard the gun from the Little Belt, before any shot or provocation had been given from the President. Had not seen the Commodore's account.

Richard Carson, midshipman.—Was on the fore-castle and gangways. Commodore R. hailed, and was answered by repeating his words; second hail was answered by a shot. Was looking at the Belt and saw and heard the gun, before any provocation from Commodore Rodgers. Gun from the President was followed by the Belt's broadside, as stated by others. Commodore's account confirmed.

Matthew C. Perry, *Silas Duncan*, and *John*

McClack; midshipmen, gave their evidence to the same effect.

Thomas Gamble, second Lieutenant.—Commanded the first division of guns. Commodore Rodgers hailed, "Ship a hoy!" Was answered "halloo!" Asked "What ship is that?" Received his own words repeated in reply. Hailed again, "What ship is that?" Then a gun from the Belt. Heard no gun or provocation from the President—swears no gun was fired from his division. Nothing but round and grape fired after the action commenced. Commodore's orders as before stated; when firing ceased finally. Belt was in a favourable position for firing, but another broadside from the President probably would have sunk her. Saw no colours on the Belt, and took her for a frigate of 36 or 38 guns. No firing on board or sheering off by the President. Statement of Commodore Rodgers confirmed.

John Neese, Captain of the first gun.—In the first division on the gun deck, was looking at the Little Belt, and saw and heard her first fire.

All the other Captains of the guns testified exactly the same as Neese.

Lieutenant Creighton testified farther, that when the Belt was silenced the second time she luffed up towards the Commodore, instead of keeping away, as she should have done to fire at the President, and would have done if her rudder had been free. Commodore R. expressed much humanity and anxiety to stop the firing. Lieutenant C. also testified to the offers of assistance from Commodore Rodgers to the Little Belt the next morning.

Here the examination closed, having as we understand, embraced every deck officer, as well as captains of guns, now on board the President, who were present during the action. The hours when the chase and action took place, with the courses steered, and some technical sea terms, are omitted as unessential to the material objects of the inquiry.

NAVAL COURT MARTIAL.—On Thursday, October 17, a Court-martial was held on board His Majesty's ship *Gladiator*, on Captain ROBERT PRESTON, of His Majesty's ship *Ganymede*, of 22 guns, which was continued by adjournment till the 23d.

MEMBERS OF THE COURT.

Capt. Paterson, President.

Capt. Bissett.

Capt. Phillimore.

— R. Hall.

— Rushworth.

Capt. P. Browne.	Capt. R. Elliot.
Capt. Halliday.	——— Lumley.
Hon. Capt. Rodney.	——— Sneyd.

M. Greetham, Esq. Judge Advocate.

Upon charges exhibited by the Admiralty of Cruelty, Tyranny, and Oppression, contained in the following letter, which had been forwarded to their Lordships by the Ship's Company of the *Ganymede* :—

“ *Portsmouth Harbour, Sept. 23, 1811.*

“ For the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the Petition of the *Ganymede Ship's Company*,

“ Humbly sheweth,

“ That your petitioners, from grievances which they labour under, through the cruel treatment they receive from the Captain and Officers belonging to the said ship, we your petitioners, humbly solicit your Lordships, that you will be pleased to remedy the same, by a change of ship or officers, as your Petitioners wish to be true to their King and Country, and are willing to serve in any ships your Lordships may think proper. Honourable Sirs, in granting this your Petitioners will ever pray. Your Lordships most obedient humble servants at command.”

It appeared to the Court, that upon the receipt of the above letter the Lords of the Admiralty directed a Court of Inquiry to be held on board the *Ganymede*, to ascertain the authenticity of the letter. This Court consisted of Admiral HARGOOD, Captains OTWAY and HALLIDAY. Upon turning up the hands, the letter was unanimously declared to have been written with the consent of the whole ship's company; and a seaman (*Mac Gowrie*) delivered another letter to this Court, which was to the same effect.—The Court of Inquiry expressed a wish, that any twelve of the crew would step forward as prosecutors in the charges. This, however, they declined; and in a letter they afterwards wrote to Admiral HARGOOD, signed by nearly all the ship's company, they stated their wish to prosecute in a body.—Upon the above documents and recital appearing before the Court-martial, Admiral HARGOOD, and Captains OTWAY and HALLIDAY were called, and proved their truth.

John McGowrie, Wm. Lowrie, George Townsend, and 17 other seamen, were examined in support of the allegations contained in the above letter. Their evidence went to prove, that Captain Preston was

more in the habit of adopting the summary punishment of starting* than the witnesses had known to have ever prevailed on board other ships; and to have frequently uttered very intemperate language.

Capt. *Senhouse*, being ordered to proceed to sea, was examined, and deposed, that Captain P. had been his most intimate friend and messmate; that he was possessed of gentlemanly manners, not habituated to blasphemous expressions, nor inclined to cruel, or oppressive, or tyrannical manners.

Sir *Home Popham* sworn.—Capt. P. asked, As you have commanded several of His Majesty's ships, and been several years in the Navy, I would beg leave to ask, whether you have not found it generally both expedient and salutary to the service, in the exercise of your own discretion, as a summary punishment, to give four dozen lashes, and sometimes more, and to what extent, at the gang-way, for offences contrary to the discipline and subordination of your ship; and whether such punishments have not been essentially necessary for the good of His Majesty's service?—The Court was cleared, and agreed, that as the information required by questions like the above was irrelevant to the charges, and contained matters of opinion unnecessary to the Court, for the purpose of forming their judgment, that the above question should not be put to the witness.

The prosecution being closed, Captain P. begged the indulgence of the Court till the next day, to make his defence: when Mr. MINCHIN having been taken ill, Mr. WEDDELL, a Solicitor, read it. Captain P. lamented that the Lords of the Admiralty should have brought him before the present Court, upon charges which were anonymously asserted, and equally directed against his officers as himself. When he assumed the command of the *Ganymede*, he found his crew in a bad state; he had to restore them to that degree of discipline and subordination so essential in ships of war; he had certainly practised a summary mode of punishment (that of starting), but there was no degree of severity mixed with it; and he conceived he was justified in the practice, by

* Starting is ordering a boatswain's mate to take a rope's end, and lay on the party until ordered to stop by the commanding officer.

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the custom in all other ships and by the salutary effects it produced in all delinquents: he never punished from caprice, nor from any feeling but that of the good of the service. When men properly conducted themselves, he was their friend and benefactor: in sickness, they often had had his personal attention, were fed from his table, and participated in all the indulgencies the service would admit of.

Lieut. Sparshott; Mr. Telfer, surgeon; Mr. Rian, boatwain; Lieut. Waring, R. M. and several other officers were sworn, who deposed, that they knew of no instance in Capt. P.'s conduct which could be designated tyrannical or oppressive.

The Court, after deliberating some considerable time, agreed, "That the charges had not been proved against the said Capt. R. Preston, and did adjudge him to be acquitted; but the Court, however, farther agreed, that they could not help feeling it their duty, to express their sense of the singularity of punishment, in many instances, on board the *Ganymede*, and to strongly recommend to Captain Preston a future change of conduct in that respect."

AUSTRIAN PAPER MONEY.—*The Regency of Lower Austria has published the following Circular.*

1. On the 16th of this month, Redemption-bills of 10 and of 5 florins shall be issued, in order to withdraw from circulation the bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins.—2. The above two sorts of redemption-bills are severally to pass in exchange for bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins; but the holders of bank-notes of a lower denomination are permitted to exchange them for redemption-bills of 10 or of 5 florins, provided they present, in one or more sorts, 50 or 25 florins in bank-notes, for 10 or 5 florins in redemption-bills.—3. From the date of the 16th of September, the exchange of bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins, for bank-notes of a lower denomination, shall cease to take place.—4. From the 15th of October next, bank-notes of 50 and of 25 florins are put out of circulation. From that date, they shall no longer be received at the Treasury, nor in payments to individuals.—5. However, permission is given, till the 31st of December, to carry the above two sorts of bank-notes to the office, created by the patent of the 20th of June last, under the name of Redemption-bill Office, and to exchange them for redemption-bills of 10

and of 5 florins; but this exchange must be entirely terminated on the 31st of December: and after the expiration of this period, the said office shall no longer receive any note of 50 or of 25 florins; because, from the first of January, 1812, these two denominations of bank-notes are, by supreme order, declared null and of no value.

FRANCIS COUNT DE SAURAU, Governor.
Vienna, Sept. 3, 1811.

FRANCE.—*Maritime Decree, issued at Hamburgh, 17th Sept. 1811.*

In the name of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c. the Commission of the Government, established by the Decree of the 18th of December, 1810, considering the Decree of his Majesty, dated 26th of December, 1810, ordering that a maritime administration and navigation police should be established in the Hanseatic departments, conformably to the laws and regulations in existence in France, upon the report of the Counsellors of State, Intendant of the Interior and Finances, decrees as follows:—Art. 1. There shall be taken throughout the Hanseatic departments, a particular account of French citizens who are destined to navigation.—Art. 2. The offices for maritime inscription are provisionally established at Hamburgh, for Hamburgh and Luneburg; at Travemunde, for the arondissement of Lubeck; at Stadte, for the arondissement of Stadte; at Bremerlehe, for the department of the mouths of the Weser; and at Varel, for the department of the Upper Ems.—Art. 3. There are comprehended in the maritime inscription, —1. Sailors of every description, whether navigating armed or merchants' ships.—2. Those who navigate, or are fishermen.—3. Those who sail in barges or boats, upon the coasts or in the roads, rivers, or canals, comprehended in the maritime districts.—Art. 4. There shall be included in the maritime inscription every citizen, aged 18, who has fulfilled one of the following conditions:—1. The having performed two long voyages, or to the Grand Fishery.—2. Having been at sea eighteen months.—3. Having been employed in the coasting fishery two years.—4. Having served two years apprenticeship to the sea.—Art. 5. All foreign sailors residing in the territory of the Empire, who have married French women, and sailed in French merchant ships, are subject to

the maritime inscription.—Art. 6. The already mentioned sailors are bound to present themselves at the office of Maritime Inscription, in the district where they reside, and have their names inscribed.—Art. 7. Carpenters, sail-makers, &c. exercising their professions in the maritime ports and places, shall be called to the military posts in the event of war, preparations for war, or of extraordinary or considerable works. There shall be kept an exact registry in the offices of inscription, and they shall be exempt from all other requisitions than those relative to the maritime service.—Art. 8. Every French citizen comprehended in the maritime inscription is exempt from all other services, than those of the Navy, Marine, Arsenals, and the National Guard, in the arrondissement of their districts.—Art. 9. Every sailor who has attained the full age of 50 years, is, by right, exempt from the requisition for the ships or arsenals of the Empire; without, however, losing the power of continuing the employment of fishing, or even serving in the ships of the State.—Art. 10. There shall be granted to enrolled sailors, pensions, according to their rank, age, wounds or infirmities. These pensions will be fixed according to their services on board the ships and arsenals of the empire, and the merchants' vessels.—Art. 11. The length of service in the three departments, either in the merchants' service, or on board ships of war, shall be computed agreeably to article 205 of the Imperial Decree of the 4th of July, 1811, as if it had taken place on board French ships, and give the same right to half-pay and pensions upon the invalid marine chest.—Art. 12. The widows and children of sailors shall have the same claims to assistance and succours, as those of military men who died in the service.—Art. 13. All Captains, &c. navigating the rivers, or on the coasts of the 32d military division, will, from hence to the 1st of November next, provide themselves with a *role d'équipage*, at the maritime office of inscription.—Art. 14. Every Captain, &c. who, after the 1st of November, sails upon the rivers, coasts, &c. of the 32d military division, and has not conformed to the dispositions of the present decree, shall be punished with eight day's imprisonment, without prejudice to still greater penalties, should there be occasion to inflict them.

Given at the palace at Hamburgh,
Sept. 17. (Signed)

The Marshal Prince of ECKMÜHL.

SICILY.—General Orders, issued at Messina, 3d Sept. 1811.

Lieutenant General Maitland informs the army, that the Commander of the Forces has already sailed for England; and that his Lordship has undertaken this voyage from the most urgent political motives, which highly interest the honour of Great Britain, and the prosperity of Sicily.—In the absence of the chief of this army, Lieutenant General Maitland finds himself more than ever obliged to be assiduous in cultivating the good-will and opinion of his brother officers; and requests from the soldiers the most solicitous attention to the fulfilment of their duties. He trusts that he will receive throughout the district the experienced assistance of the General Officers, and that the entire army shall be united and ready for every emergency that the vicissitude of events may produce.—The four following persons, namely, Orazio Ballantinio, Antonio Barese, Vincenzo Smirida, and Giovanni Grillo, who have been imprisoned for holding correspondence with the enemy in Calabria, have been set at liberty by order of General Maitland, on his return from Palermo.—These persons have been liberated, not because there wanted sufficient proof against them, but because the General would not condemn to death, immediately after having assumed the command of the British army, four men, who were arrested by his predecessor, whose departure prevented the pending sentence.—He avails himself of this occasion to exercise an act of clemency, which will not be renewed at any other time. He is resolved to use his utmost means to put an end to the system of *espionage*, and of treachery, which has been for so long a time, and in a manner so notoriously practised by persons of evil intentions, and equally enemies of the Sicilian people and the British. He is resolved, in consequence, to watch attentively persons of this description; and is determined from this time forward, to bring before a Council of War, those, whoever they may be, who shall be thus found holding communication with the enemy, and thus placing in danger the British army and this Island; and immediately the sentence of that Council shall be executed. J. CAMPBELL, Adj. Gen.

SPAIN.—THE WAR.—French Official News from the Armies in Spain.

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ARMY OF THE SOUTH.

On the 20th of August, general Godinot came up with, at Torbiscan, the rear-guard of Montijo, and overthrew it; on the 21st he found a part of the division in position at Velez de Benaudella; he immediately caused it to be attacked; it was routed with the bayonet: a great number were killed, and night alone favoured the escape of a few. Montijo got off with 12 men only.—In the meanwhile Colonel Dulong entered Motril, and pursued the other part of the enemy's division, which had retired to Pinos del Rey; the Adjutant General Remond, detached from Grenada to assist the operations of Godinot, arrived at the same time with one battalion and two squadrons; six companies detached by General Godinot also made their appearance; in an instant the village was penetrated and carried; the enemy, pursued to the summit of the mountain La Cruz, was precipitated from it, with the bayonet, into frightful ravines. The loss of the enemy cannot be calculated; a very few escaped under the cover of night. This division was composed of the regiments of Alpuxares, of Cuenca, of Burgos, of a number of united bands, and 300 horsemen.—The Duke of Dalmatia having ordered Count D'Erlon, commanding the 5th corps in Estramadura, to direct an expedition towards the mouth of the Guadiana, for the purpose of completely clearing that country of the bands of Ballasteros, who has still about 3,000 men left; General Quiot, and the Adjutant Commandant Foreister, were charged with this expedition. Ballasteros, after an action of little importance, made off in all haste, and embarked at Ayamonte for Cadiz. Two hundred Spaniards were sabred in this expedition, and a detachment of 78 cavalry with their horses were taken. The chief of squadron Millet has distinguished himself.—General Cassagne occupies Ronda in force; his moveable columns do not permit any band to gain a moment's footing in the mountains. Every day brigands are arrested, who are delivered up to justice.

DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE.

The Duke of Dalmatia seems satisfied with the spirit which prevails in the provinces of Malaga and Granada. He has returned to Seville. The Duke of Bellona pushes his operations before Cadiz.—General Darmagnac has advanced with his division upon Cuenca, to second the ope-

rations of Marshal Suchet against Valencia.—Colonel Reizet, of the 13th dragoons, has surprised, with a detachment of his regiment, the band of Chavo. He shot 120 of these banditti and took their horses.—The insurgents of Murcia attribute all their defeats to being abandoned by Lord Wellington: they breathe the most bitter complaints against the English.

ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

Ciudad Rodrigo, Sept. 30, 1811.

Report of the Marshal Duke of Ragusa, Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal, to his Highness the Prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, Major General.

MONSEIGNEUR,—I had the honour of acquainting your Highness, that after having raised the siege of Badajoz, and driving the English army beyond the Guadiana, it was settled between the Duke of Dalmatia and myself, that I should advance towards the Tagus, leaving one division on the Guadiana; that the army of the South should leave the 5th corps in Estremadura; that the Duke of Dalmatia, with his troops, should march against the Spanish divisions which had quitted the English army, and against the insurgent army of Murcia; and that, while he should destroy them, and clear the provinces of Cordova, Granada, Malaga, and Murcia, I should keep in check the English army. We had taken our measures in case the English General should make a diversion, and again advance upon Badajoz; but the English General, deaf to the Spaniards, abandoned the army of Murcia to its fate, and passing the Tagus, advanced to the Coa. It was then supposed to be his plan, to march to the assistance of the army of Galicia.—As soon as General Dorsenne was informed of this new combination, he marched upon Astorga, beat the Gallicians, dispersed them beyond Villa Franca, and repaired the fortifications of Astorga. We hoped that this movement would induce the English to advance upon Salamanca; but they remained unconcerned at this event, as they had been at the disasters of the Murcian army.—About the beginning of September, I learned that seven divisions of the English army were all assembled on the Coa; that they blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; that they were collecting fascines and gabions at Fuente Guinaldo; that the works of their entrenched camp at Fuente Guinaldo were already advanced, and that even the besieging equipage had arrived there from Oporto. I then pro-

posed to Gen. Dorsenne, to join him with a part of my army, in order to raise the siege at Ciudad Rodrigo,—to supply it with provisions for a long time,—to take the entrenched camp of the enemy, his magazines, and park of besieging artillery,—and, in short, to give him battle and pursue him as far as was compatible with the general plan of operations which your Highness communicated to me in your last letter in cypher; a plan which embraces all these regions. I have now the satisfaction of announcing to your Highness, that our arms have been completely successful.—I set out with five divisions of my army, and arrived on the 22d, by the pass of Banos, at Tamames, where I formed my junction with the four divisions of General Dorsenne. I admired the good condition of a convoy of 1,500 carriages, laden with provisions, which had been collected and organized with an activity and an order that are extraordinary. The two armies put themselves in motion. We drove in all the enemy's posts, and on the 24th introduced the whole convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo. This fortress is, therefore, supplied with provisions for a long period.—Count Dorsenne gave up to me the troops of the garrison which belonged to my army corps, and replaced them by those of the army of the North.—On the 25th we put ourselves in march. Two leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo we perceived the English rear-guard. General Montbrun, commanding our advanced guard, charged the enemy with that rapidity and boldness which he has so frequently displayed; and took from them four pieces of cannon. We made ourselves masters of the ridge, and maintained ourselves there in spite of all the efforts of the English, who were obliged to commence a retreat. General Montbrun pursued them for two hours; his fire was so lively, that he expended all his ammunition. The loss of the enemy was considerable; he never stopped till he reached the camp of Fuente Guinaldo; but our advanced guard alone was there: our divisions of infantry were a march in our rear. Had not this been the case, the English army was lost: we had the mortification of seeing its divisions precipitate themselves in all directions towards their entrenched camp. If I had then only 15,000 men at hand, the English army would have been caught in a flagrant

fault, and beaten in detail, without being able to reunite. The division of the English General Cole was still at Pajo; while the light division of General Crawford was at Martiago; but our infantry only arrived during the night; and at day-break we perceived the entrenched camp entirely lined with enemy's troops. General Dorsenne and myself made the necessary dispositions for attacking, on the 27th in the morning: but the English General did not think proper to await us; he abandoned his camp during the night, retiring from Alfayates and Sabugal. We entered into Fuente Guinaldo next day, and caused to be conveyed to Ciudad Rodrigo a great quantity of fascines, and other materials collected for the siege. I caused the enemy's lines to be destroyed; his retreat was conducted in three columns. General Montbrun went in pursuit of him by the route of Casillas de Flores. General Watier, with the cavalry of the army of the north, took the direction of Albergeria; he came up with the rear-guard of the enemy at Aldea del-Ponte, and immediately charged them. The division Souham having arrived, the action was glorious for the arms of his Majesty, and the enemy was driven back with great loss and confusion. The rear-guard continued to retreat upon Sabugal. We have taken the baggage of the Prince of Orange and of General Crawford. The confusion was so great in the English army, that an Aide-de-Camp of Lord Wellington, while endeavouring to rejoin that General, threw himself into our ranks. We have made two hundred prisoners. The army of Portugal has had one hundred and twenty men made unfit for service; the enemy's loss amounted to between seven and eight hundred men. Assure his Majesty that the Spanish insurgents have felt the greatest indignation on seeing themselves thus abandoned in the North, as in the South; and this contrast between the conduct of the English and the promises which they have incessantly broken, nourishes a national hatred which will break out sooner or later.—I must mention with praise Generals Montbrun and Boyer, Capt. Hubert, of the 22d Chasseurs, lieutenant Merel, of the 15th Light Dragoons, as well as my Aides-de-Camp Jardot and Favier.

(To be continued)